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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
'BILLS AND NOTES.
Pennsylvania, in opposition it seems to the general weight
-of authority, has held that a certificate of deposit is not a
ccifcte, negotiable instrument: London Say. Fund Soc. v.
of Deposit Hagerstown Say. Bank, 36 Pa. 498. In Bank of
Negotiability Saginaw v. Title and Trust Co. of Western Penn-
sylvania, 105 Fed. 491, the United States Circuit Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania holds this a ruling .upon a
-point of general commercial law, and under the principle of
Swift v. Tyson, refuses to follow it, but holds such certificate
negotiable.
The statute of Indiana makes contracts in consideration of
.a gambling debt void. The well-settled rule that a note given
Considcration on such consideration is void even in the hands of
,Gambling Debt, a bona fide holder for value, is applied in the case
Estoppel of Irwin v. Marquett, 59 N. E. 38, but this is
immediately followed by a decision allowing a recovery on
such a note, on the ground that the indorser of a note before
,purchasing it had taken it to the maker and asked whether it
was all right, and the maker had not indicated that he had any
-defence to it, and that such conduct estopped him from setting
up its invalidity: Pitchett v. Ahrens, 59 N. E. 42.
A note and mortgage were executed by a wife and delivered
to the payee of the note, on consideration that he would cease
Suppression to prosecute and would settle a criminal offence,
of a for the commission of which the husband was at
Prosecution the time under arrest on a warrant sued out by
-such payee. In Jones v. Dannenberg Co., 37 S. E. 729, the
'Supreme Court of Georgia holds that this may be pleaded and
proven as a defence to the foreclosure of the mortgage so
given, even in the hands of one who was the bona fide holder
-of such note for value, before due and without notice.
In Dils v. Bank of Pikeville, 6o S. W. 715, accommodation
indorsers of a note made payable to themselves sought to
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Agreement to escape liability thereon on the ground that it was
Procure delivered on condition that another indorser should
AdditionI be secured thereon. The Court of Appeals holds
Indorser this no defence to an action on the note, since it
was delivered on this condition to the payee, and not to the
principal obligor, and the court denies the possibility of a
'delivery in escrow of negotiable paper to the payee. The
defendant, it is said, may recover damages for breach of the
agreement.
BOYCOTT.
The authorities which allow an injunction or damages for
interfering with an individual's right of contract "all expressly
injuncion, turn upon the fact that there was coercion, intim-
D-mages idation, or malicious threats to do an unlawful
injury." So the Court of Appeals of Colorado holds in
Master Builders' Assn. v. Domascio, 63 Pac. 782, and conse-
quently refuses to give either an injunction or damages where
a letter was sent to architects of a building signed by members.
of a master builders' association, in which they declined to
bid on the building if plaintiff's bid should be received in
competition.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
In Fox v. Mohawk and H. R. Humane Soc., 59 N. E. 353,
the Court of Appeals of New York holds that the summary
Dog Ucenses, appropriation of a dog for non-payment of a tax
Due Proces imposed, without notice to the owner, is not a
of Law taking a property without due process of law. The
court refers to the doctrine of qualified property only existing
in such animals and says that "there may be said to be no
property in them against the police power of the state," but
admits that such legislation in regard to domestic animals,
such as horses, oxen and the like, would be unconstitutional
The constitution of Indiana required a "majority" of the
"electors" to ratify an amendment to the constitution. This,
rajority ot the Supreme Court of the state, In re Denny, 59
ulectors N. E. 359, holds, means more than half of those
qualified to vote at the time the vote was taken. Justice
Jordan vigorously dissents, and in an elaborate opinion, in
which he refers to numerous authorities of various states,
strongly supports his position that the language means a
"majority of those who exercise the right of sufirage," and
should include merely those who voted on the proposition.
It is interesting to note that the question arose in consequence
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of an effort to change the constitutional provision that "every
person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled
to admission to practice law in all courts ofjustice," and to place
the regulation of qualifications in the hands of the legislature.
There were 240,031 for the change, 144,072 against it, but it
appearing that there were more than twice 240,031 electors,
the court held the amendment not adopted.
CONTRACTS.
In Hagartine-McKittrfich Dry Goods Co. v. Swofford Bros.
Dry Goods Co., 68 Pac. 281, it appeared that the mercantile
Rescission, company, plaintiff in error, in consideration of the
Fraud, surrender to it of large valuable property rights,
Retaining upon a part of which it had a mortgage, had
Benefits assumed and agreed to pay the mercantile indebt-
edness of the mortgagor. On this contract it was sued by a
creditor of the mortgagor. It set up as a defence fraud on
the part of the mortgagor, but it appeared that it continued in
possession of the property. Under these circumstances the
Court of Appeals of Kansas holds it cannot repudiate its
agreement to pay mercantile creditors. Two courses, it is
said, are open to it: to repudiate the whole transaction and
restore the status quo and be relieved of all obligation on the
contract, or to affirm the contract, bear the obligations and
have recourse upon the mortgagor for damages sustained by
his fraud and deceit.
On a contract with an unincorporated association for the
erection of a creamery the party undertaking to build sought
Subscription, to recover from some of the associates for unpaid
Several subscriptions. It appeared that fifteen of the sub-
Obligation scribers had limited their liability by fixing the
amounts of their several subscriptions in all $1,7oo. Eleven
did not fix these amounts. The stipulated contract price was
$3,oo. In Cornish v. West, 84 N. W. 75o, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota acknowledges its inability to find precedents, but
holds the liability of the eleven last mentioned to be several
and not joint, and that each was bound to pay one-eleventh of
$I,3o0.
The well-known rule that an attempted acceptance, varying
materially the terms of an offer, not only does not bind the
Option to contract, but even operates as a rejection of the
Purchase offer, was held in McCormick v. Stephany, 48 At.
25, not to apply to the case where a man had granted an
option to a lessee to purchase the demised premises, and the
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lessee had demanded a greater conveyance than this allowed
him. The Court of Chancery of *New Jersey proceeds on the
ground that the option is not a mere offer, but that it is "a
completed purchase of a right to have a conveyance if the
purchaser shall choose to buy upon the terms named."
The Supreme Court of Oneida County, N. Y., holds in
Goldman v. Ehrenreich, 68 N. Y. Supp. 424, that where a debtor
Postponement offers to pay an installment due, but is told by the
of Payment, creditor that he does not want the money, and that
Consideration the payment may be deferred a year, and the
debtor, acting on this proposition, does not pay the install-
ment, but uses the money for other purposes, such conduct
amounts to an agreement to postpone payment for a year.
The desire of the creditor to have his money remain invested
is a sufficient consideration for the agreement. Apart from
this the creditor is estopped by his conduct from demanding
payment before the expiration of the year.
A contest arising in consequence of the death of Augustin
Daly appears in Strauss v. Daly, 68 N. Y. Supp. 597, in which
Termination an effort is made to recover against Daly's exec-
by Death utors on a contract made with him, by which he
granted the exclusive right to furnish the programs of the
theatre for three years, the size of the programs to be deter-
mined by the manager. He died before the commence-
ment of the period, and his executor disposed of the theatre.
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department,
holds his estate not liable, on the ground that the contract
was made on the implied condition of the continued existence
of the parties. But the contract having been assigned recov-
ery is allowed to the assignee for the amount paid Daly upon
the execution of the contract.
A New Jersey corporation, engaged in the business of
indemnifying against losses on credits, contracted with the
Breacb, plaintiff that he should act as its agent in Massa-
Defenceof chusetts for a term of years, and forthwith the
illegality plaintiff entered upon his duty as such agent.
During the prescribed term the corporation became insolvent,
and for that reason the contract was broken. When the agent
had begun his work, the Insurance Commissioner of Massa-
chusetts had decided that it was lawful for him to do so, but
later the Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided the busi-
ness to be unlawful in the state. The plaintiff sued for a
breach of the contract, and the defendant corporation set up
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these facts as a defence. In Rosenbaum v. U. S. Credit-Systent
Co., 48 AtI. 237, the Court of Errors and Appeals of New
Jersey holds that such illegality is no defence to the plaintiff's
suit, but can only affect the extent of the recovery. Chief
Justice Magic, with whom concur two other justices, dissents
on the ground that "damages for being prevented by the
insolvency of the company from procuring contracts which
the company had no lawful authority to make cannot be
recoverable."
The Court of Appeals of New York, in Wood v. Wtitehead
Bros. Co., 59 N. E. 357, holds valid a contract "to give up the
Restraint business of dealing in molding sand obtained from
of Trade sandbanks in the county of Albany," although
unaccompanied by the sale of any business, plant or stock.
The strict doctrine against such agreements, the court says,
"had its origin at a time when the field of human enterprise
was limited, and when each man's industrial activity was more
or less necessary to the material well-being and welfare of his
community and of the state." The rule was founded on
public policy, and "the conditions which made so rigid a
doctrine reasonable no longer exist." "Contracts which have
for their object the removal of a rival and competitor in a
business are not to be regarded as contracts in restraint of
trade. They do not close the field of competition except to
the particular party to be affected." The facts of the case
hardly necessitate such broad language, but its use, in view of
modern economic tendencies, is significant.
CORPORATIONS.
The transference by a corporation of its franchises except
under permission of the law is held, in Sinonds Y. East
Transfer of Windsor Electric Railway Co., 48 Atl. 210 (Conn.),
Franchise to be such a breach of a public trust as will deprive
the incorporators of relief in a case like the following: They
had transferred the franchise to one A., in consideration that
he should build the railway, and in case of his failure to build
it, should retransfer the franchise. A. did fail to build, and
specific enforcement of his contract was sought, but was
refused, the transaction being regarded as illegal, and equity
deciding to let the parties stand as it found them.
DEAD BODIES.
In Pulsfer v. Douglass, 48 Atl. 118, the Supreme Judicia
Court of Maine, admitting that the husband has a right to
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Rights of determine the place where his wife's body shall be
Husband buried, and to bury it there, holds that when
once the dead body has been buried it becomes a part of the
ground to which it has been committed, and an action of
trespass might be maintained against any one who disturbs
the grave and removes the body; at least, so long as the
cemetery continues to be used as a place of burial. However,
the court says that a court of equity in this country, where
there are no ecclesiastical courts, may, under some circum-
stances, permit the husband to remove his wife's body from
the land of another, as where the burial was not with the
intention or understanding that it should be her final resting
place. On principle, it would seem that this same holding
should be had where the burial was without the consent of
the husband. The court refers, for a discussion of the law on
this subject, to Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery,
Io R. I. 227.
HOMICIDE.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds in Thomson v. State,
85 N. W. 62, that the true rule undoubtedly is that a man
Defen1-of may defend his domicile, even to the extent of
Domicile taking life, if it be actually or apparently necessary
to prevent the commission of any felony therein. But the
court implies that this is not all, for it says: "Whether this is
the precise limit of the domiciliary right it is not here necessary
to determine; but, if it is the limit, then popular sentiment is
not in accord with the law."
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
The line that distinguishes the valid from the invalid con-
tract when husband and wife separate, however clear it may
Separation, be in theory, is frequently, like so many other
Agreement rules, not easy to apply to the facts. Thus in
for support Baum v. Baum, 85 N. W. 122, the plaintiff and
defendant agreed to live separate and apart, and the defendant
thereupon agreed to contribute sufficient money to support
his family and to make an absolute assignment of certain
policies of life insurance to his wife. In a suit by the wife for
specific performance of the contract to transfer the policies, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, adverting to the old strictness
of the English law on this point and the present laxity thereof
(see I Bish. Mar. & Div., §§ 1263, 1264), adheres to the strict
view and regards the contract in question as against public
policy, inasmuch as it tends to a breaking of the marital rela-
tion, and therefore void.
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In A. R. Beck Lumber Co. v. Rupp, 59 N. E. 429, it appeared
that A. had conveyed land to B. subject to a secret oral trust
Lien, Tenant's for himself, but C. was in possession as tenant of
Possession as A. from the time of the conveyance to B., until B.
Notice reconveyed. The Supreme Court of Indiana holds,
under these circumstances, that the possession of C. is such
notice to judgment creditors of B. as to prevent the lien of
their judgments from attaching. The creditors sought to
raise the question of the Statute of Frauds to prevent B. from
retransferring, but the court holds this a defence personal to
B., and having executed the trust, his creditors have no claim.
JURY.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Curran v.
Stein, 6o S. W. 839, that where a court gives a peremptory
Peremptory instruction for the defendant, it is not error to
instruction compel the jury to return a verdict in obedience
and Return to the instruction, though a number of the mem-
Verdict bers of the jury protest. "The peremptory
instruction of the court to the jury, like any other order the
court may make in the case, must be obeyed. The verdict,
though in form the act of the jury, is really the act of the
court. The court determines the case. The verdict of the
jury is merely a form of putting on record the judgment which
the court has given."
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
A termination of a prosecution by agreement of defendant
and prosecutor is held, in Craig v. Ginn, 48 At. 192, not a
Termination sufficient termination to sustain an action for mali-
of cious prosecution where the following facts
Prosecution appeared: The accused, on being brought into
court, asked for a postponement, but the prosecuting witness
refused to consent to any delay, and thereupon an agreement
was made postponing a settlement between the accused and
the prosecuting witness till the former could produce his
accounts, and the prosecution was abandoned, each paying
one-half the costs. The case of Robbins v. Robbins, 133 N. Y.
597, is cited as not supporting this view, but the court regards
its decision as in line with the principles of the law.
MORTGAGES.
The implied notice of a record is not, it seems, that knowl-
edge which avoids the effect of a false representation believed
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Representz- and acted on. So in Zeis v. Potter, 105 Fed. 671,
tions by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit,
A-ssgor, holds that one who sells notes secured by a sec-
Estoppel ond mortgage, falsely representing such mortgage
to be a first lien, cannot invoke the record of a prior mortgage
held by himself as notice to the purchaser, but as between
them the purchaser is entitled to priority of lien.
NEGLIGENCB.
The frequency of accidents at railroad crossings naturally
tends to the hardening of rules as to what constitutes the
Duty to Look standard of due care in such a situation. The
and Lstn Supreme Court of Wisconsin seems not to have
come to the strict Pennsylvania view that it is necessary
to stop, look and listen, but appears to be rapidly tending in
that direction, as is seen in its decision in Guld v. W/ldtcomb, 85
N.W. 142. It is there held that the only diversion of attention
which will excuse failure to look and listen before crossing a
railway track is where the attention is so irresistibly forced to
something else as to deprive a traveler of the opportunity to
look and listen.
PARENT AND CHILD.
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division (N. Y.), holds, in
People v. New York Juvenile Asylum, 68 N. Y. Supp. 656,
Custody, that where a mother because of her destitution had
Habe Corpus surrendered her child to the care of a juvenile
asylum for two years, and that asylum has indentured the
child to a person in another state, the mother, after the expira-
tion of the two years, will not on application, by a writ of
haleas corpus, obtain an order for the restoration of the child
without giving proof that the child is in the control or cus-
tody of the asylum, if such control or custody is denied by
the return to the writ. Two of the five judges dissent, on the
ground that the asylum must still be presumed to have con-
trol of the child, and it is for it to show its physical inability
to produce it.
PARTNERSHIP.
In Hopkins v. Adey, 48 Atl. 41, the facts showed a loan by
one partner to her co-partner, taking a note guaranteed by a
Partner's co-maker. The money so obtained was applied
Liability with the knowledge of the lender to the payment
of partnership debts. Soon after the partnership was dissolved,
though perfectly solvent. In an action on the note the defence
was made that there was no consideration for the note,
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because the money was applied to the firm's debts, for which
the payee was equally not valid. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland holds this defence not valid, on the ground that
the property of an individual partner is not liable for the firm's
debts until his individual creditors have been paid and the
firm's assets are exhausted.
RAILROADS.
In Indiana the Employers' Liability Act'provides that every
railroad or other corporation, except municipal, in the state
Acton shall be liable in damages for injury to employes,
Against etc. In Hunt v. Conner, 59 N. E. 5o, the appellate
Receiver court of that state holds that under this statute an
action may be maintained against the receiver of the railroad
company, since he, operating the road under the court's con-
trol, exercises the franchises of the corporation for the benefit
of the corporation and its creditors, and the action is substan-
tially against the corporation in his hands. The court says:
"There is some conflict in the decisions, but the greater weight
of authority sustains our conclusion."
In Iowa the sounding of the whistle of an engine approach-
ing a crossing and the ringing of its bell are statutory require-
Aceldentat ments. The Supreme Court of that state holds in
Crossing, Graybillv. Chicago N. & St. P. Ry. Ce., 84 N. W.
Cattle 946, that the failure to observe these regulations
is negligence, which will warrant a recovery for cattle injured
by the failure so to do, as such statutes are not solely for the
protection of human beings. And the court regards it the
province of the jury to decide whether the "failure so to do"
explains why the cattle did not "get out of the way," a rather
speculative question, but one not hard for a jury of farmers to
answer.
"When the employe, in carrying out a purpose of his own,
does injury to another, not within the scope of his employ-
Trespasser ment, the employer is not liable." This the
on Train. Supreme Court of Louisiana lays down as the
Violent settled test of when a master is exempt from lia-
Removal bility for the acts of his servant, making the pur-
pose of the servant the criterion: Dorsey v. Kansas City, etc.,
Ry. Co., 29 Southern, 177. The rule is applied to a case where
a man was stealing a ride on a freight car, and the brakeman,
seeing him, at once began to pelt him with rocks and clods;
and when he attempted to escape he fell under the wheels and
was injured. The court holds the railroad company liable,
since the servant acted to effect its purpose, not his own.
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How far the consideration of public inconvenience will affect
the right to specific performance of a contract with quasi-
Grade public corporations raises interesting questions.
Crosslg, Thus in Goding v. Bangor & A. R. C'O., 48 Atl.
Hardship 114, it appeared that there was a contract on the
part of a railroad to purchase from a farmer a right of way
through his farm and in part consideration therefor to estab-
lish at a given point a grade crossing. This contract the farmer
sought to have enforced after the construction of the railroad,
but specific performance is denied by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine on the ground that a grade crossing being a place
of recognized danger, the public safety and convenience would
be injuriously affected, and that this, combined with the fact
that the additional burden placed on the railroad would be
disproportionate to the benefit to the plaintiff, is sufficient
reason for refusing specific performance.
What constitutes the part performance sufficient to take an
oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds and allow specific
statute of performance thereof is difficult of application in a
Frauds, Part case like Russell v. Briggs, 59 N. E. 303, where
PcrfOrma"c two general rules somewhat conflict, viz., the rule
that mere payment of the consideration is not sufficient, and
the rule that when the acts alleged as part performance indi-
cate a contract qua the land in question the contract may be
shown. In that case the defendant orally agreed to pay
plaintiff for his services in superintending the repair of certain
property, procuring tenants, collecting the rents and assisting
to find a purchaser therefor, a definite proportion of the land.
The majority of the Court of Appeals of New York hold this
a contract within the statute, and the acts not such part per-
formance as to take it out. In an elaborate dissenting opinion
Chief Justice Parker reviews this branch of the law and comes
to an opposite conclusion. His dissent is concurred in by
two other justices.
STATUTR OF FRAUDS.
The Statute of Frauds in Rhode Island provides that no
action shall be brought on a promise to answer for the debt or
Assignment default of another person, unless the promise is in
of Claims writing, signed by the party to be charged. In
Stillman v. Dresser, 48 Aft. i, the Supreme Court of the state
holds that this does not apply where the assignee of claims
for services agreed not to enforce the same against the debtor,
but to have the amount determined, and then assign them to a
third person on his contract to pay for the same. The court
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regards it as an agreement not to answer for the debt of
another, but merely to take an assignment of the right, and
proceeds on the general principle that where the court will
regard the transaction as primarily an assignment the statute
does not.apply.
STATUTE OF. LIMITATIONS.
In Smith v. Blacley, 47 Atl. 985, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania holds that the statute commences to run against
Fraud an action for money obtained by fraud from the
time the transaction is completed by the receipt of the money,
-where nothing is thereafter done by the person receiving it to
prevent inquiry and discovery of the fraud. Two widely diver-
gent views, it is said, exist; on the one hand, that the fraud,
though complete and fully actionable, operates as of itself a
continuing cause of action until discovery; on the other hand,
that when the cause of action is once complete the statute
begins to run and suit must be brought within the prescribed
term, unless some additional and affirmative fraud is done with
that intent. The former appears to be the view of the United
States courts, while the latter prevails in New York.
SURFACE WATERS.
In Stein v. Coleman, 48 AtI. 206, the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut holds that a landowner can neither
Draining, obtain an injunction nor recover damages, where
Injunction, his neighbor has so built his house and so graded
Damages his premises that whenever it rained the water fall-
ing thereon flowed onto and through such landowner's prem-
ises, washing away the soil and lawn and destroying valuable
trees. Every change in an owner's property, it is pointed out,
will necessarily change the direction of the drainage, and for
this the court refuses to recognize any liability. "But it is
not permitted that the owner may accumulate the surface
water thereon and by artificial means turn it upon his neigh-
bor's land for the purpose of relieving his own from it." The
court seems to regard a roof not an "artificial" means, but
that a spout or trough would be, the idea of" accumulation"
apparently playing some part.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
Ever since the case of Reese v. Telegraph Co., 123 Ind. 294,
the Appellate Court of Indiana has held that an action may
Failureto be maintained to recover damages for mental
Deliver anguish arising from failure to deliver a death
I'essagc message. The court reverses this holding and a
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number of cases which followed it, in Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Ferguson, 59 N. E. 416. Twenty-six of the courts of
last resort in this country and the highest courts of England,
it is said, are contrary to Reese's Case, and the court proceeds
on the general principle that mental pain and anguish cannot
themselves constitute a cause of action, though it is admitted
that in regard to torts producing mental suffering, such suffer-
ing may constitute an element in determining the damages.
Several courts still hold the contrary doctrine, among them
Tennessee, North Carolina and Alabama.
VOTERS.
The Constitution of New York provides (Art. 2, § I) that
every male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, possessing
Property the required qualifications as to residence, shall be
Qualification entitled to vote for all officers elected by the peo-
ple, and on all questions which may be submitted to the vote
of the people. In Spitzer v. Village of Fulton, 68 N. Y. Supp.
66o, the Supreme Court of Oneida County holds that the
provision of the charter of Fulton requiring a property quali-
fication of voters, voting on the question of the issue of bonds
by the village, was not in conflict with this provision, which
was only intended to prescribe the qualification of voters
voting on questions submitted to the whole people of the
state, and did not restrict the power of the legislature to
require other or different qualifications for voters in cities and
villages on local matters. The similarity of the constitutional
provision to the provisions of the constitutions of other states
renders the holding of more than local interest.
WILLS.
By a testator's will the legatees were "to share" pro rata
in any increase or decrease" that might arise upon the settle-
Residuary ment of his estate. He bequeathed $200 each to
Clause, Right A. and B., as directed to be paid by the will of his
of Legatee mother. The Surrogate's Court of Winchester
County (N. Y.) holds, in ln re W/iting, 68 N. Y. Supp. 733, that
A. and B. may not participate in the residue, though regard-
ing the other legatees as entitled thereto. The ground is
that these legacies are not paid by reason of testator's bounty,
but in deference to some direction of testator's mother.
